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Introducing a fairness based theory of prosecutorial legitimacy before the 







The International Criminal Court became operative ten years ago. The first Prosecutor 
of the Court faced the enormous challenge to set up a series of policies addressing at 
the same time the backlog of overriding expectations. His task was daunting and his 
prosecutorial choices triggered a series of controversies among a variety of relevant 
audiences, while the concept of legitimacy appeared to become the panacea to the 
debate.  The current contribution purports to achieve a twofold goal via a doctrinal, 
descriptive but also normative angle;1) To provide an alternative normative theory of 
the thorny principle of prosecutorial discretion and particularly of the interests of 
justice reference, based on the fairness aspect of legitimacy; 2) to recommend an 
alternative to the adopted, as of today, prosecutorial policy with regard to the interests 
of justice reference in article 53, emphasizing its long term effect on the overall 





Following its adoption in 1998 the Rome Statute,1 the International Criminal 
Court (the Court) was characterized in rather high prose by the then UN Secretary 
General “a gift of hope for future generations.”2 Twelve years later the current 
Secretary General of the United Nations reiterated the same belief, stating that the 
“[t]he Rome Statute represents the best that is in us, our most noble instinct … the 
instinct for peace and justice.”3  
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1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome 
Statute]. 	  
2 Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Address at the Rome Conference 
(Jul.18, 1998). 
3 The Secretary General, An age of Accountability, Address at the Review Conference on the 




Notwithstanding these initial triumphant acceptance, the Court has completed 
its first decade of operation, being subjected to scathing critique by academics and 
experts.4 Among others, the policy of self-referrals, the selection of the first situations 
and cases, the slow and controversial judicial progress,5 the accusation of being solely 
an “African Court”6  and the tension between judicial intervention and so called 
“peace”, triggered serious concerns even from the side of the most persistent 
proponents of the Court.7   
 Over the last ten years, the Office of the Prosecutor and the fundamental 
concept of prosecutorial discretion, as it develops in article 53, lie in the heart of the 
controversy about the a-political nature of the Court and, ultimately, its role, limits 
and goals.8 On one hand, the very first Prosecutor of the Court adopted a single and 
persistent response to every critique about his choices, focusing on his role as a 
judicial actor who simply applies the law, irrespective of exogenous factors. On the 
other hand, the predominant academic response, with some rare exemptions, has been 
focused on the need for establishing ex ante selection criteria for situations and cases 
and the controversial notions of gravity and the interests of justice. In particular, these 
two last concepts are considered by many to be a loophole, that carries the risk to defy 
the conventional wisdom that the International Criminal Court is an independent and 
autonomous institution, purported to combat impunity, promote accountability and 
contribute to prevention of criminality, independently of the political context. Within 
this context the quest for legitimacy has become a major challenge raising an 
interesting but narrowly defined discourse especially among legal audiences. 
The current proposal purports to precisely examine a particular component of 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during the term of the very first Prosecutor of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER 
POLITICS (2014). 
5 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute (Mar. 14, 2012).	  
6 Charles Jallow, Regionalising International Criminal Law, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 445-499 (2009). 
7 Mahnoush H.Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman, The Law in Action of the International Criminal 
Court, 99 AM.J.INT’L L. 385 (2005),Claus Kress, Self- referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944, 946 (2004), William Schabas, First Prosecutions at the International Criminal 
Court, 27 HUM. RTS. L.J. (2006), M. Cherif Bassiouni,The ICC-Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
(2006), but for the opposite position see Payam Akhavan, Self Referrals before the International 
Criminal Court: Are States the Villains or the Victims of Atrocities? 21 CRIM. L. F. (2010), Daryl 
Robinson, The mysterious mysteriousness of complementarity, 21 CRIM. L. F. (2010), Rod Rastan, 
Comment on Victor’s Justice and the viability of ex ante standards, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 569-602 
(2010).	  
8 See the contributions analyzing the OTP in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR, PROMISE AND 
CONSTRAINTS (Minow, Frost and Whiting, eds.,2015). 
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the Court (the adopted policy by the Office of the Prosecutor on the interests of justice 
reference in article 53) and link it to the broader question of legitimacy of the 
Prosecutor’s Office. The concept of justice within the Rome Statute represents the 
classic format of a retributive version, combined with the other goals of criminal law 
such as deterrence, rehabilitation, reconciliation and expressivism.9 However, the 
reference “interests of justice” in article 53 appears to be an exception to the basic 
rule, a state of exception.10  As it is widely acknowledged, it represents a broader 
concept of justice transcending the strict width of prosecutorial criminal justice. 
Moreover, it is considered to be so novel that it “[d]oes not correspond to any 
provision in positive law.”11 If the interests of justice clause is an exception to the rule, 
this proposition definitely seems to be paradoxical. Can a non-strictly legalistic form 
of justice be included in the Rome Statute, the “apotheosis of the international 
insistence on prosecutions” to use Justice Goldstone’s reference to the Statute.12   
 The targeted aim of this proposal is not an examination of the overall 
performance of the International Criminal Court. The predominant goal of this 
research challenges the adopted policy by the Office of the Prosecutor on the interests 
of justice reference in article 53. The main research question does not purport to 
provide a specific definition on the content of the word justice within the interests of 
justice reference. Instead it focuses on the legitimacy challenges and legal and policy 
dilemmas arising from this specific term for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as 
a long term project.  
The concept of prosecutorial discretion in international criminal justice 
	  
Ronald Dworkin has stated that  
 
“Discretion like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open 
by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. It always 
makes sense to ask, ‘Discretion under which standards?’ or‘Discretion as to which 
authority?”13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For the purposes of criminal law see, BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (David Young trans. 
1986), H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1970) and more recently G.P. FLETCHER, 
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 50 -76 (1998) and specifically for international criminal law see 
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 149-180 (2007). 
10 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (2005). 
11 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Interaction between National and International Criminal Law in the 
Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 10 (2006).  
12 Richard Goldstone & Nicole Kritz, International Criminal Court, In the Interests of Justice and 
Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers, 13 L. J. INT’L L. 655 (2000). 




 Particularly in the field of international criminal justice, the notion of prosecutorial 
discretion carries an interesting but controversial dynamic. The overall question of 
prosecutorial discretion has been addressed extensively by a series of scholars, who 
have covered many aspects of the challenges that the Prosecutor of an international 
criminal tribunal in general and of the International Criminal Court in particular has to 
face.14 The former Prosecutor of the International Criminal tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, Justice Louise Arbour, in a statement before the Preparatory Committee 
during its December 1997 session, describing the difference between domestic and 
international prosecutions stressed that in the latter case 
[t]he discretion to prosecute is considerably larger and the criteria upon which 
such prosecutorial discretion is to be exercised are ill defined and complex. In my 
experience based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the real 
challenge posed to a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious complaints 
the appropriate ones for international intervention rather than to weed out weak or 
frivolous ones.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See D.D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion before National Courts and International 
Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. (2005), A. Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
(2003), M.B. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L. 
CRIM. JUST.  (2004), Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, Challenging the legitimacy of initiating 
contemporary international criminal proceedings: rethinking prosecutorial discretionary powers from 
a legal, ethical and political perspective, 15 CRIM. L. F. (2004), Christopher Keith Hall, The powers 
and role of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Global fight against Impunity, 17 
L. J. INT’L L.	    (2004) Hassan B.Jallow, Prosecutorial discretion and International Criminal Justice, 3 J. 
INT’L. CRIM. JUST.  (2005),William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial activism at the 
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. (2008), Luc Côté, International Justice: 
Tightening up the Rules of the Game, 81 INT’L REV. R. C. (2006), Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise 
of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law 3 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. (2005), H. Olásolo, 
The Prosecutor of the ICC before the initiation of investigations: A quasi judicial or a political body?, 
3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. (2003), A. Greenawalt, Justice without politics? Political Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (2007), Carsten Stahn, Judicial review of 
prosecutorial discretion, five years on, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (Stahn and Sluiter eds., 2009), Jens David Ohlin, Peace, security and Prosecutorial Discretion, 
in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Stahn and Sluiter eds., 2009), 
Fabricio Guariglia, The Selection of cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Stahn and Sluiter eds., 
2009), William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial discretion and gravity, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Stahn and Sluiter eds., 2009), Jan Wouters, Sten Verhoeven and 
Bruno Demeyere, The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor: Navigating between 
Independence and Accountability, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(Doria, Gasser and Bassiouni eds., 2009), Danesh Sarooshi, Prosecutorial Policy and the ICC, 
Prosecutor’s Proprio Motu action of Self-Denial?, 2 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST.  (2004), Chris Gallavin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion within the ICC: Under the pressure of Justice, 17 CRIM. L. F (2006), James A. 
Goldston, More Candour about Criteria, The exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. (2010), Michael J. Struett, The Politics of 
Discursive Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics and Implications of Prosecutorial Discretion at 
the International Criminal Court, in GOVERNANCE, ORDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
107-132 (Steven C. Roach ed., 2009), Frédéric Mégret, International Prosecutors: Accountability and 
Ethics, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 416 (Reydams, Wouters & Ryngaert eds., 2012). 
15 Justice Louise Arbour, Statement at the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of a 
International Criminal Court 7-8 (Dec. 8, 1997)   
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The principle of prosecutorial discretion has been a predominant feature of 
international criminal justice since Nuremberg. 16  The chief prosecutors at the 
International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo had to follow the guiding 
principles agreed by the Allies.17 Yet both Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals assigned the prosecutors with the responsibility “for the final designation of 
major war criminals to be tried at the tribunal.”18  
In the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the feature of 
prosecutorial discretion is further reiterated, since the prosecutors can select cases for 
prosecution ex officio,19 “albeit within the tight jurisdictional framework of the ad hoc 
institutions.”20  
In the case of the International Criminal Court with its global jurisdictional 
terrain, the notion of prosecutorial discretion is particularly critical since the 
Prosecutor is empowered by the Statute to initiate independently not only 
prosecutions but also investigations.21 This is a unique feature that differentiates the 
ICC from the ad hoc and hybrid Tribunals, highlighting the statutory principle of 
prosecutorial independence as, prescribed in article 42 of the Rome Statute.22 Under 
this exceptional framework, the quest for balanced, independent and objective 
selection of situations and cases has been made the main priority for most of those 
involved in the international criminal justice project, due to the concern that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial activism at the International Criminal 
Court, 6 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 731 (2008). 
17 T. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 40 (1992). 
18 Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal, art. 14(b) and Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal, art. 8(a).  
19 Art.18(1) of the ICTY  Statute and Art.17(1) of the ICTR Statute prescribe that “The Prosecutor shall 
initiate investigations ex-officio on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly 
from Governments, United Nations Organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. 
The Prosecutor shall access the information received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient 
basis to proceed.” For a comparative presentation of all Tribunals since Nuremberg see Bergsmo, Cissé 
and Staker, The Prosecutors of the International Tribunals: The cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR and the ICC Compared, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 121-154 (Louise Arbour, Albin Esser, Kai Ambos and Andrew 
Sanders eds., 2000). 
20 William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial activism at the International Criminal 
Court, 6 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 733 (2008). 
21 Morten Bergsmo and Pieter Kruger, Article 53, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1066 (O. Triffterer ed., 2nd ed., 2008). 
22 Id.  
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“discretion entails both risks and benefits”, as it may trigger “unjustified 
discrimination” and affect the perception of the criminal justice system as a whole.23  
 Exercise of prosecutorial discretion - prosecutorial guidelines  
	  
Ronald Dworkin differentiates three forms of discretion. There is an initial 
weak version, which covers situations where the standards to be applied require a 
form of judgment and thus, cannot be applied mechanically.24 A second weak version 
of discretion empowers a final judgment that cannot be reviewed due to the position 
of the incumbent person in the top of a hierarchy.25 Whereas the strong version of 
discretion governs cases of absolute lack of standards, where the judgment is not 
subjected to any authoritative review, yet it is not totally immune to criticism.26 
 Applying the first form of weak discretion in the context of international  
criminal justice Hassan Jallow has argued that 
[t]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard to the investigation of 
criminal conduct and the institution of judicial proceedings is a necessary and 
fundamental concept in the administration of criminal justice. Its necessity springs 
from the practical need for a selective rather than automatic approach to the 
institution of criminal proceedings, thus avoiding the overburdening and perhaps 
clogging of the machinery of justice. Somebody somewhere thus has to decide 
whether to initiate proceedings and for what offence or offences.27  
 
This “somebody somewhere” is the Prosecutor of every international criminal 
tribunal, whose powers have been described elsewhere as “one man’s warranty is 
another man’s wild card.”28  If the Prosecutor of an international criminal tribunal is 
regarded such a predominant figure and her choices can carry a legitimised function 
for the overall project of international criminal justice, then how is that prosecutorial 
discretion exercised? 
The concept of prosecutorial discretion is largely based on policy criteria, 
which usually are not defined in the statutes of the tribunals, leaving a huge gap of 
indeterminacy. This is what is called prosecutorial policy or strategy. This 
prosecutorial policy should be founded on public prosecutorial guidelines which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 A. Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 518 (2003). 
24 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1998). 
25 Id. at 32. 
26 Id. at 32-33. 
27 Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial discretion and International Criminal Justice, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
145(2005). 
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according to the predominant view, strengthen the legitimacy of the Court and 
establish transparency.29  
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, arguably enjoys the 
benefit of the vast experience obtained by the ad hoc tribunals during the last fifteen 
years. Yet, the International Criminal Court is of unique character, due to the 
jurisdictional structure and its differences with the ad hoc or hybrid tribunals should 
not be overlooked, in the sense that any analogous construction and application 
should take into consideration its suis generis nature.30  
The above introduction to the general concept of prosecutorial discretion 
elucidates the relativity that characterizes this principle and explains the anxiety that it 
has triggered among lawyers and legal scholars, who adopt a positivist conception of 
the law. The notion of discretion depends substantially on the context that surrounds it 
and it is shaped by policies and principles that identify the nature and function of the 
institution where it operates.31 The mainstream legal scholarship in the field of 
international criminal justice reluctantly applies the first weak form of prosecutorial 
discretion as developed by Dworkin.  This non-mechanical application of the law 
thereby requires a form of guidance. The belief in the existence of objective criteria 
has become the principal attribute of the ‘good’ international criminal lawyer, who 
disassociates herself from the ‘dirty’ world of politics. Within this context, the 
concept of legitimacy as well has been transformed into a central subject of concern 
among legal scholarship attempting predominantly to objectify the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion with clear selection criteria. 
Prosecutorial discretion and the International Criminal Court 
 
Article 53 of the Rome Statute prescribes the breadth and limits of 
prosecutorial discretion in the Rome Statute. The four paragraphs of the article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See characteristically A. Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM.J.INT’L L. (2003). 
30 Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial discretion and International Criminal Justice, 3 J.INT’L CRIM.JUST. 
149-154 (2005),   It should be clarified that the ad hoc tribunals were created by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII resolutions creating a different legal obligation regarding cooperation. A contrario, 
the International Criminal Court is a treaty based organisation with broader temporal and geographical 
jurisdictional terraine since it is an ex ante judicial institution that depends predominantly on state 
cooperation. However, the practice of the last fifteen years has indicated that the lack of state 
cooperation is endemic even for the ad hoc tribunals, despite their Security Council “birth”.  
31 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-45 (1998), where he analyzes the different 
normativity between law and principles as conceived by positivist lawyers. 
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regulate the power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation and a prosecution, the 
review power of the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding a prosecutorial decision not to 
proceed and the power of the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision, sitting thus “at the 
junction between prosecutorial discretion and judicial review.”32 
Article 53 comes into play after the activation of one of the three triggering 
mechanisms (notitia criminis) provided in article 13.33 A State Party can trigger the 
exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court via a referral of a situation to the Prosecutor.34 
Additionally, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter can refer a situation to the Prosecutor.35 Finally, the Prosecutor herself may 
initiate an investigation proprio motu, following an authorization by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.36 Immediately after the activation of the triggering procedure, the stage of 
preliminary examination of a situation is initiated, as it is set out in article 53 (1)(a)-
(c). 
In order to decide whether she should proceed or not with an investigation, the 
Prosecutor has to consider three accumulative criteria in subparagraphs a, b and c of 
article 53. Specifically the Prosecutor has to pass the test of jurisdiction; the second 
test is the admissibility requirement as prescribed in article 17 of the Statute and 
finally the Prosecutor has to decide that the investigation despite the gravity of the 
crimes and the interests of the victims, would not serve the interests of justice. If the 
Prosecutor decides not to investigate, then she is obliged to inform the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, if her decision is solely based on the interests of justice criterion. 
Paragraph 3 of article 53 governs the judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion which is twofold. When triggered at a request of the Security Council or the 
Referral State then the Pre-Trial Chamber may review the decision not to proceed and 
may request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision.37 On the other hand, when the 
prosecutorial decision not to proceed is based solely on the interests of justice 
requirement then the Pre-Trial Chamber may exercise its review powers proprio 
motu.38 In that case, the decision of the Prosecutor is not valid unless confirmed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE, Article 53, Initiation of an investigation 657 (2010). 
33 See generally HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (2005). 
34 Rome Statute, art.13(a) and art.14.  
35 Id. art.13(b). 
36 Id. art.13(c) and art.15 
37 Rome Statute, art. 53(3)(a) and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R.107. 
38 Rome Statute, art. 53(3)(b). 
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the Pre-Trial Chamber.39 If the Pre-Trial Chamber does not confirm his decision then 
the Prosecutor must proceed with the investigation or prosecution.40  
Professor Delmas-Marty has described article 53 as a compromise between 
strict legality and prosecutorial discretion.41  From one hand the indeterminacy 
especially of the terms “gravity” and “interests of justice” appear to allow substantial 
interpretative loopholes in the exercise of prosecutorial considerations for the 
selection of situations and cases.42 On the ther hand, the actual scope of judicial 
review in article 53(3) raises a series of subquestions regarding the width of a 
prosecutorial decision not to investigate or prosecute and the actual judicial power to 
overturn a relevant decision by the Prosecutor. 
  Yet, as a general conclusion,  it can be observed that the notion of 
prosecutorial discretion, as finally delineated in the Rome Statute, is not an unfettered 
one. On the contrary, it is subject to checks and balances, which were the product of 
harsh compromises and trade offs. Those limitations in the application of 
prosecutorial discretion are institutional and pragmatic.43 In that sense the words of 
Louise Arbour that “[t]here is more to fear from an impotent than from an 
overreaching Prosecutor” sound prophetic.44   
 
The interests of justice and its discontents 
 As it was mentioned above, article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute dictates that 
the Prosecutor, in deciding whether to initiate an investigation or not, shall consider 
that even “taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, 
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests of the justice.”45  The interests of justice consideration is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. 
40 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 110(2)   
41 Mireille Delmas –Marty, Interaction between National and International Criminal Law in the 
Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC, 4 J. INT’L CRIM.JUST. (2006).  
42 Carsten Stahn, Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, Five years on, in THE EMERGING 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 267 (Stahn and Sluiter eds., 2009). 
43 Allison Danner differentiates between formal and pragmatic accountability in A. Marston Danner, 
Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal 
Court, 97 AM.J.INT’L L. 524-534 (2003) whereas Carsten Stahn speaks of four models of 
accountability: political accountability, process-based checks and balances, (self-regulation) and 
judicial review in Carsten Stahn, Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, Five years on, in THE 
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 259 (Stahn and Sluiter eds., 2009). 
44 Justice Louise Arbour, Statement at the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court 7-8 (Dec. 8, 1997). 
45 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9(entry into force 
1 July 2002)[hereinafter Rome Statute], art.53. 
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countervailing one.46 Contrary to the jurisdiction and admissibility which “[a]re 
relatively clear and judicially cognizable notions,”47 the interests or better non-
interests of justice provision “[m]oves along a principle of largely discretionary 
criminal action.”48  
Article 53(2)(c) has a different wording. Subparagraph 53(2)(c) provides that 
the Prosecutor may conclude that a prosecution is not in the interests of justice taking 
under consideration all circumstances, including the gravity of the crimes, the 
interests of the victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator and his or 
her role in the alleged crime. Here, the word “nonetheless” is missing and replaced by 
the term “all the circumstances.” Whereas in art. 53(1)(c) the gravity of the crimes 
and the interests of justice are counterweights to the interests of justice, in art. 
53(2)(c), they appear to be indicators of the interests of justice consideration.49 The 
additional two elements of age and infirmity carry humanitarian and practical 
concerns,50 suggesting that “each case has to be determined on its own merits.”51  
 
Problem of ‘Content’ and “Application”  
 
The issue of the interests of the justice, as it appears in article 53 of the Rome 
Statue, represents one of the most contentious and complex aspects of the Treaty. 
It is the point where many of the philosophical and operational challenges in the 
pursuit of international criminal justice coincide (albeit implicitly) but there is no 
clear guidance on what the content of the idea is.52 
 
The “interests of justice” provision in article 53 is a tool, which may never be 
applied by the Prosecutor and subsequently reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. This 
provision lies at the heart of the prosecutorial discretion, whereas at the same time it 
challenges the rationale underpinning the creation of the International Criminal Court.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice at 3 (Sept. 2007). 
47 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE, Article 53, Initiation of an investigation 660(2010). 
48 Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT Vol. 1, 1153 (A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R.W. D. Jones eds., 2002). 
49 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE, Article 53, Initiation of an investigation 667(2010). 
50 Id. 
51 Morten Bergsmo and Pieter Kruger, Article 53, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1073(O. Triffterer ed., 2nd ed., 2008) whereas Chris Gallavin, Aricle 
53 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: In the Interests of Justice? 14 K.C.L.J. 
186(2003) talks of an “internal or intrinsic” interpretation of the interest of justice. 
52 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (Sept. 2007). 
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The International Criminal Court was created to end impunity for the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.53 At the same time, 
article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) empowers the Prosecutor not to proceed with an 
investigation or prosecution, when the interests of justice criterion is not served.  
The interests of justice reference has been linked to propositions that it could 
be used as a loophole allowing the Prosecutor to consider the option of truth and 
reconciliation commissions, national amnesties and the prospect of peace process 
agreements, all considered to be of non-legal but mostly political nature.54 These 
questions were not finally addressed by the Rome Statute, a product of compromises, 
despite the exchange of opinions during the negotiation period.55  
Yet, the “interests of justice” reference is not only a problem of content 
(meaning in abstracto). It is also a problem of application (meaning in concreto).56 
This latter dimension, pertains to the width and scope of the policy priorities and extra 
legal considerations that the Prosecutor may take into account, while exercising 
hir/her discretion. The ongoing academic and not only dialogue, triggered by the 
“creative ambiguity”57 of the article 53 language, illustrates the dynamic nature of this 
reference.58 Thus, it has been supported that “[t]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Rome Statute, prmb. para. 5. 
54 See eg. MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS, AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 83 (2010) 
where he claims that “the interests of justice test has been at the heart of the Article 53 debate, and of 
the global debate on amnesty as such”. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this article an extensive analysis 
on amnesties. 
55 Hafner et al, A response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
108,109(1999). 
56 According to the understanding of the current author the interest of justice references is a hard case 
of “relative indeterminacy”. This term has been used by H.L.A. Hart to describe situations where vague 
expressions due to their “open texture” leave a margin of discretion, but they remain relative, since 
they need to be assessed within the limits of law. This doctrine also aims to preserve the objectivity of 
law and to differentiate it from politics and other considerations.  Under this normative rubric the 
interests of justice term in article 53 includes a problem of content and a problem of application. See 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2nd ed. 1994) and MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY 
TO UTOPIA, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 26, 40 (2nd ed., 2005). 
57 The term “creative ambiguity” is attributed to Philip Kirsch, former president of the ICC and 
chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521-2 (1999). 
58  Indicative enough are the following articles: Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507 (1999), Diba Majzub, 
Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3 MELB. J. INT’L L. 247 (2002), 
Arsanjani, The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Law, ASIL Proceedings 1999, 
Jessica Gavron, Amnesties in the light of developments in International Law and the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court, 51 INT’L& COMP. L.Q. 91-117(2002), Carsten Stahn, 
Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the 
International Criminal Court, 3 J.INT’L CRIM.JUST. 695-720 (2005), Darryl Robinson, Serving the 
Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. 
J.INT’L L. (2003), Thomas Hether Clark, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
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in accordance with Article 53 bears the potential of gradually crystallizing a coherent 
approach to the room left for alternative responses and for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion on the domestic level”.59 Others have called the reference  “a 
safety valve”, “an expression that was intended to leave the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion unfettered”60 or “an escape clause”61 that allows the prosecutor “to arbitrate 
between the imperatives of justice and the imperatives of peace.”62  
In general, there are three different sets of argumentation regarding the 
prosecutorial discretion, its scope and application as prescribed in the interests of 
justice reference in article 53 of the Rome Statute and subsequently its role towards 
amnesties, alternative justice mechanisms and peace negotiations. There were some 
who hailed the existence of this provision in the statute and advocated for the 
inclusion of broader considerations of security and stability when applied,63 others 
who acknowledged the option of prosecutorial discretion, within its limits though, 
provided both by the mandatory judicial review and the current legal trends,64  
whereas the last group considered it at least controversial and risky for the legitimacy 
of the overall project of international criminal justice, proposing instead a restrictive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Amnesties, and the ‘Interests of Justice’ Striking a Delicate Balance,4 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 
(2005), Kenneth A.Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 22 L.J.INT’L L. (2009), Richard Goldstone & Nicole 
Kritz, International Criminal Court, In the Interests of Justice and Independent Referral: The ICC 
Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers, 13 L.J.INT’L L. (2000), Chris Gallavin, Aricle 53 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: In the Interests of Justice? 14 K.C.L.J. (2003), Henry 
Lovat, Delineating the Interests of Justice, DENV.J.INT’L L.&POL’Y (2007), Drazan Dukic, Transitional 
Justice and the International Criminal Court- in ‘the interests of justice’?,89 INT’L REV. R. C. 
(2007),Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always be Prosecuted: Where the 
International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. (2000), MARK FREEMAN, 
NECESSARY EVILS, AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 82-84 (2010), LOUISE MALLINDER, 
AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS, BRIDGING THE PEACE AND JUSTICE DIVIDE 
286-291(2008).  
59 JANN K.KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTIONS 291 (2008). 
60 William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial activism at the International Criminal 
Court, 6 J.INT’L CRIM. JUST. 748,749 (2008). 
61 MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS, AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 83 (2010).  
62 Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 
J.INT’L CRIM. JUST. 178(2005)(citing further William Bourdon in LA COUR PÉNALE INTERNATIONALE, 
2000)).  
63 See eg., Le Fraper Du Hellen, Round Table: Prospects for the Functioning of the International 
Criminal Court, in  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity 
300(M.Politi and G.Nesi eds., 2001) and Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, 
Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court,14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 488(2003). 
64 Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative 
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J.INT’L CRIM. JUST. 708 (2005).  
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interpretation.65  This latter position has been adopted, by the three leading non-
governmental organizations (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
International Federation for Human Rights), which oppose fiercely any potential 
application by the Prosecutor, building up their argumentation on a series of legal and 
policy points.66 The restrictive view regarding the interests of justice reference, rejects 
any policy considerations, claiming that the object and purpose of the Rome Statute 
does not allow for a deferral by the Prosecutor under this clause. 
In September 2007 the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) issued a policy paper, 
addressing the issues arising from the interests of justice clause. That policy paper 
was the product of consultations between the Office of the Prosecutor and non-
governmental organizations, dated back to November-December 2004.67  
Firstly, the paper emphasizes that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under article 
53(1)(c) and 53 (2)(c) is exceptional.68 Secondly, it adopts a teleological interpretative 
approach focusing on the dimension of prevention of the core crimes as one of the 
objects and purposes of the Statute.69 Finally, the drafters of the policy paper highlight 
its most controversial argument, that there is a difference between the notion of the 
interests of justice and the interests of peace and in the latter case, they support that 
there are other responsible institutions assigned to deal with concerns of security and 
stability.70 
Regarding the interests of the victims, the policy paper reiterates its strict 
flexibility, since it initially acknowledges, that despite the wording of article 53(1)(c) 
which implies the preference of the victims for prosecutorial justice, there is still the 
possibility of divergent views, which the Office of the Prosecutor assures that will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See eg. Human Rights Watch, Policy Paper: The meaning of “the interests of justice” in article 53 of 
the Rome Statute, Jun.4, 2005 available at: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf., 
Amnesty Int’l, Open Letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: The concept of 
interests of justice, Jun.2, 2005, Héctor Olásolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC before the initiation of 
investigations: A quasi –judicial or a political body?, 3 INT’L.CRIM. L.REV. 87-150 (2003).  
66 See Human Rights Watch, Policy Paper: The meaning of “the interests of justice” in article 53 of the 
Rome Statute, June 4, 2005 available at: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf. 
[hereinafter HRW policy paper], Amnesty Int’l, Open Letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court: The Concept of Interests of Justice, June 2005 available at:  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/023/2005[hereinafter Amnesty Int’l policy paper], 
FIDH, Comments on the Office of the Prosecutor's draft policy paper on « The interest of Justice », 
(Sept. 14, 2006) available at: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_comments_-_interests_of_justice_-
_final.pdf  [Hereinafter FIDH comments]. 






respected.71 Yet, it reiterates that the interests of victims of any merit for the process 
before the OTP, are confined to issues of criminal justice.72 
Finally the policy paper acknowledges that criminal justice is only a limited 
component of the overall project of combating impunity for the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole and “as such, it fully endorses 
the complementary role that can be played by domestic prosecutions, truth seeking, 
reparations programs, institutional reform and traditional justice mechanisms in the 
pursuit of a broader justice.”73  However, it fails to address the scenario, where those 
other justice tools could be contributed in the existence of “exceptional circumstances,” 
which would make the Prosecutor to abstain from an investigation or prosecution 
under the interests of justice criterion. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the policy 
paper does not accept those “other” mechanisms as a feasible alternative to criminal 
justice. 
Doing justice to the interest of justice 
In particular, among the three above mentioned potential scenarios for 
application of the specific reference, the peace-justice approach of the OTP triggered 
a polarising dialogue, predominantly between political scientists and lawyers, in the 
context of northern Uganda and Darfur.74 The Office of the Prosecutor never used (at 
least they never admitted that they considered) the interests of justice provision and 
proceeded with indictments in the situation of Northern Uganda, DRC, Darfur, Kenya 
and Lybia.  
 The peace- justice debate, despite the clear objective of the Office to address the 
interests of the victims in article 15 and 53, highlighted the problematique regarding 
the goals and vision of the Court as a whole.  The response to this critique emphasized 
the need for independent, impartial and objective application of the adopted selection 
criteria for situations.75 The persistence in objectifying the selection process revealed 
a dynamic dichotomy between those who consider the project of international 
criminal justice a clear case of pre-determined goals and those who appear to be more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice at 7 (Sept. 2007) referring further to the Report of 
the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in conflict and post conflict societies, 
U.N.Doc. S/2004/616(Aug.23, 2004). 
74 See eg. the contributions in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA (Wadell 
& Clark eds., 2008) and the collected essays of the Oxford Transitional Justice Research, Debating 
Justice in Africa, The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford, (2008-2010).  
75 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013. 
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skeptical towards the specific proposition.76 The same position (pro-objective criteria) 
purports to differentiate law from politics and reflects the “liberal theory of 
politics.”77.  Yes, the need for prosecutorial guidelines in a generic manner, which 
“[g]uide but not prescribe in advance decision making”, can be definitely 
acknowledged.78 Yet, while a series of scholars link the concept of legitimacy of the 
Court with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion79 and the need for specific and 
clear criteria, ex ante standards, their analysis appears to develop in hypothetical 
scenarios, which actually touch upon another fundamental contention, that until the 
telos of the International Criminal Court is defined in clarity and its unique nature 
fully understood, the conversation on prosecutorial criteria misses its point of 
reference.80 The present paper will attempt to introduce the question of legitimacy via 
the threefold framework of legal, moral and sociological legitimacy.  
The fault lines of legitimacy81 and the ICC 
 
Since Nuremberg there is a growing movement on combating impunity for 
gross violations of human dignity, which develops under the premises of the rule of 
law concept.82 The Nuremberg principles summarize the normative core upon which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Stephanos Billas & William Whitney Burke-White, International Idealism meets Domestic- 
Criminal Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L. J. 637, 681-2 (2010) but see Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity 
and the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1435-1449 (2009). 
77 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 24 (2nd ed. 2005) (1989). 
78  James A. Goldston, More Candour about Criteria, The exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 403 (2010) 
79  See eg. A.Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. (2003), James A. Goldston, More 
Candour about Criteria, The exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. (2010), Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion Not to Proceed 
in the “Interests of Justice”, 50 CRIM.L.Q. (2005), Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. (2005), D.D. Ntanda 
Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion before National Courts and International Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM.JUST. 127(2005), M.B. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal 
Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 76 (2004), William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial 
activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 733(2008). 
80 See e.g., Margaret de Guzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International 
Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 268-269 (2012), A. Greenawalt, Justice without politics? 
Political Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.  650 (2007). 
81 Hilary Charlesworth, Conclusion: The Legitimacies of International Law, in FAULT LINES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 396 (Charlesworth & Coicaud eds., 2010). 
82  See e.g., A. Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1998) and A. 
Cassese, On the current trends towards criminal prosecution and punishment of breaches of 
international humanitarian law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2 (1998), Payam Akhavan, Justice and 
Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal  
Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 325 (1997), Payam Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes 
in the Former Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture for the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 262 (1993) 
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the field of modern international criminal law was built.83 It is founded on the 
perception of a global community that purports to retain and strengthen shared moral 
values with the aim to foster peace and coexistence.84 Professor Bassiouni, while 
developing his theory on punishment for jus cogens international crimes, refers to a 
civitas maxima which “transcends the interests of the singular” on a common interest 
in “repressing certain international crimes,”85 while the late Antonio Cassese speaks 
about “universal values”.86  
This position, though, is far from uncontested. Thus, this “oceanic feeling”87 
advocating for the universality of humanity, which shares the same goals and 
purposes, has been severely criticized as a “cosmopolitan dream” or even as a 
hegemonic project of the West to “civilize” the rest of the world.88 But even if it is 
accepted that there is this humanity, which shares common moral aspirations, then as 
Mark Drumbl observes, “[i]t is one thing to agree to the universal repudiation of the 
great evils and to agree that victims are entitled to accountability. It is another matter 
to accept the universality of categorizing the great evils as crimes.”89 
Within this context, the International Criminal Court 
[a]spires to institutionalize the ideal of universal justice. In its inclusive notion of 
human suffering in which ‘all peoples are united by common bonds’ the ICC 
embodies the cosmopolitan world view in which all victims are citizens deserving  
the protection afforded by the rule of law. The Court’s intent to treat all people 
equally and to privilege no one over another is a cornerstone of 
cosmopolitanism’s regard both for ‘the moral worth of persons’[and] the equal 
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moral of all persons.90 
 
 Trying to find a balance between this quest for cosmopolitan values and 
global institutional framework, the majority of the legal scholars,  despite the “faith of 
the international criminal lawyer”91 resort to legitimacy in order for Koskenniemi to 
“ensure a warm feeling in the audience”.92  
The concept of legitimacy in general has obtained a variety of contents and for 
that reason a proliferation of theories and modalities may be observed.93  It has even 
been supported that it is exaclty this inderterminacy of the concept that makes it such 
an attractive concept at least in the international arena.94 At the same time the elusive 
content of legitimacy has been severely criticized as another instrumentalized power 
exercise at the expense of “formality’.95 It can be broadly supported however that the 
notion of legitimacy implies the justification of authority96 either to render binding 
rules or binding decisions with an element of deference.97 
The notion of legitimacy carries both a normative and sociological meaning.98 
The former implies the right to rule irrespective of the existence of coercion, whereas 
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the latter entails the belief of the right to rule.99 Or as Bodansky explains, the 
sociological or popular dimension of legitimacy pressuposes acceptance of authority 
by the public as justified.100 Whereas normative legitimacy prerequisites justification 
of authority on an “objective” sense.101  Additionally, while the normative form of 
legitimacy requires a process of evaluation, the sociological version is predominantly 
of empirical nature. 102  In that sense despite their proximity and sporadical 
interrelations, the two dimensions of legitimacy remain destinct.  
Alternatively, there are three main angles that the notion of legitimacy is 
perceived with. The first one is the procedural view of legitimacy, which is 
predominantly legal. Legal legitimacy reiterates the initial validation of authority via 
state consent and provides the conditions under which the authority is considered to 
be legitimate, [t]he condition of being accordance with law or principles.103 The 
second view of legitimacy is the moral one, developed on an idea of justice, like the 
one developed by Allen Buchanan who emphasises the importance of the moral 
justification for an entity to act.104 According to this theory, the entity secures its 
moral justification when it protects human rights and advocates for justice.105 Finally, 
the third perspective of legitimacy is the subjective one, as evolved by Ian Hurd, who 
focuses on the perception of a norm irrespective of its moral value.106  
The tripartite dichotomy is also reflected in the diversification between source, 
procedural and substantive based legitimacy.107 The first one implies consent, the 
second one entails fairness whereas the last one requires desirable outcomes 
depending on the relevant audience.108 Each of these perspectives defines legitimacy 
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COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW16-20 ( Sellers ed., 2012). 
103 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and The Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV and Daniel 
Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?  93 AM. J. INT’L L. 605 (1999). 
1794 (2005) and  
104 ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2004). 
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in a very different way, whereas the complexity of the relevant audience has at least to 
be acknowledged.  
Returning to the the particular angle of the paper, the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion has been linked to the overall function and legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court.  In this context, as it was mentioned before, several scholars suggest 
the adoption of ex ante guidelines, which would objectify the selection process, add 
transparency and clarification in the work of the main figure, the Prosecutor and thus 
enhance the legitimacy of the Cout.109 Mainly they suggest the pursuit of legitimacy 
via right process.110  
Under this rubric, it has been supported that the legitimacy of the international 
criminal tribunals derives “[f]rom the manifested fairness of their procedures and 
punishments”.111 Professor Bassiouni similarly has claimed that “[t]he legitimacy of 
the ICC will not be sustained on the basis of occasional referrals based upon political 
expediency but will depend on the consistency of its work”,112 adding that “[t]he 
success of the ICC will not be predicated on the simple arithmetic of case numbers 
but on the regular flow of cases and more particularly on the fairness, objectivity and 
effective management and costs of the institution”.113 Margaret deGuzman on the 
other hand, exploring particularly the concept of gravity,  has argued that the 
jurisdictional threshold of gravity serves the moral or legal legitimacy of the Court, 
whereas the notion of “relative gravity” enhances the sociological legitimacy of the 
International Criminal Court.114 
However, one could observe a confusion about the various aspects of 
legitimacy, where procedural requirements are mixed with sociological dimensions 
and moral expectations with legal or subjective validation.115 Still, the demanding 
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quest of legitimacy, might provide a more nuanced and humble understanding of the 
overall function and capability of the Court, contextualising the demand for a more 
coherent and effective attribution of justice.116 
 From Legitimacy to Legitimization?117 
 
The first decade of prosecutorial action and inaction triggered an interesting 
debate between academics and practitioners. Legal and policy questions were raised 
in an unprecedented exchange of opinions among public international and criminal 
lawyers, among realists and idealists or otherwise apologists and utopians.118 The 
justice-peace debate, in northern Uganda, DRC and Darfur with the arrest warrant 
against a current Head of State, and more recently the situation of Libya, carried both 
a strong legal and sociological dimension of legitimacy where the strict application of 
the Rome Statute, contravened with diverse social perceptions both on the affected 
socities and among the legal community. This latter controversy put the OTP in an 
unprecedent turmoil, elevating to the level of a Schmitian dichotomy between enemy 
and friends.119  
Yet, the natural subsequent question to be asked is, legitimacy to the eyes of 
whom? The International Criminal Court functions among an array of relevant 
constituencies such as the state parties, the civil society and the directly affected 
communities, the “victims”. Additionally the diverse angles of legitimacy, legal, 
moral and subjective one, add a second level of normative uneasiness. At the same 
time, the Rome Statute has raised different expectation to the various constituencies 
that exacerbate the legitimacy gap.  This “global” community consists of states, 
individual experts, ngos, victims and affected communities. Each of these actors 
defines the goals of the Court in a different way according with each own priotities.   
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The Rome Statute is the product of very good intentions. It is beyond the 
purpose of this contribution to doubt the values of its drafters. Yet, it can be argued, 
that due to its special character, the credibility or legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court,  is enhanced when the affected communities that it is purported to 
serve, share a minimum at least stardard of acceptance.120 Otherwise, the Court 
becomes the subject of discourse among a small elite, who shares thorough 
knowledge and access to its functions, excluding those who are immediately affected 
but its decision.121  
Within this context the idea of legitimization as pronounced by a series of  
sociologists122 appears to provide another way to deal with the problems arising from 
a narrow application of a normative concept of legitimacy focusing strictly on 
procedural fairness123, representation and transparency.124 Under this normative rubric 
and applying the sociological model of Weber, the Court and in our case the 
Prosecutor has to be reflexive and not only representative of the society. In that sense 
she should interact not only with the legal elites and the states but also with the 
society, in an open dialogue where the Office of the Prosecutor will acknowledge the 
various expectations and subsequently adjust its policies in order to legitimize its 
practice.125  
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This suggestion appears to be in contract with the adopted position by the OTP 
to focus on the legal or procedural legitimacy, which contributes to a predominantly 
external legitimization. It is not enough for the OTP to address solely source or else 
input legitimacy and process or procedural one. In order to achieve a holistic form of 
legitimization the OTP should also be concerned with so called result based 
legitimacy, the one which can be identified with outcomes that influence state conduct.  
This legitimization process will allow the OTP to engage in a sincere dialogue, 
which will be especially beneficial at least when considering the interests of justice 
reference. As it was mentioned above the interests of justice reference is a question of 
content and application, central among a diversity of perceptions and the existence of 
a normative schism between those who very characteristically have been described as 
“judicial romantics” and “political realists.   
 
From Legitimization to Fair Balance (µέτρον) using the tool of the interests of 
justice. 
 
The International Criminal Court consists of a hard form of legalization, 
containing all three characteristics.126 However, the institutionalisation of justice127, as 
it had been evolved within the context of juridification128 and judicialisation129, starts 
encountering suspicions and critique.130 According to the prevailing opinion among 
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legal scholars and experts, the International Criminal Court is a judicial institution. 
But could it be also a political body? And if it is not a purely judicial body, then this 
twofold dimension (being both a criminal and a security court) how can it be 
substantiated? In other words, what are the goals of the International Criminal Court? 
Are its purposes confined in rendering individual accountability or should the Court 
promote reconciliation, peace and security on the ground? If this is the case then when 
should the Court intervene? Moreover, in the case of intervention, wouldn’t the 
Prosecutor consider political and exogenous factors contrary to his persistence that 
those parameters are outside his spectrum?  
The present paper supports that the International Criminal Court is a sui 
generis creation functioning under the premises of the first scenario, that of the Court 
being a hermaphrodite institution.  If we accept that there is a legal proprium of 
universal condemnation of the core crimes, then the interests of justice reference with 
its openended character is a fundamental legal and policy tool to render the Prosecutor 
invulnerable to political expediency, guiding him in the quest for harmony and fine 
balance (µέτρον).  
 The normative dimension of metron (µέτρον) in the specific context means 
fine balance, balance between the various goals of the International Criminal Court. In 
this sense, until the scope of the Court is delineated, the Prosecutor may confont the 
tension arising from the demands for accountability and the realities on the ground, 
using the tool of the interests of justice reference, as a “[g]uarantee of prosecutorial 
diplomacy”.131 Furthermore, the interests of justice clause empowers the Prosecutor 
with a sense of fairness. Fairness here means rightness, an intrinsic quality of 
balance.132 In Greek, the word Δικαιοσύνη entails both concepts of justice and fairness. 
Δίκαιο means both just and fair. To ignore the realities on the ground entails the risk 
to render criminal justice a project without merit. To be apprehensive on the other 
hand of the particularities of the societies that are at stake is not only a quality of 
justice but also of fairness. 
In this exercise the Prosecutor of the Court, must demosntarte the virtue of 
right balance, or else phronisis as it has been developed in the Aristotelian philosophy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
131 MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS, AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 83 (2009). 
132 The present thesis does not adopt the retributive dimension of fairness as developed by Thomas 
Franck in his seminal work, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS. 
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of Ethics.133 The virtue of phronisis liberates the Prosecutor from legalistic constraints 
and guides her towards fair and contextualized decisions.134 Yes, the Prosecutor must 
apply the law; yet, the application of her prosecutorial discretion should be exercised 
under the auspices of fair balance and wisdom. 
In a different context Thomas Franck wrote that “[l]aw…does not thrive when 
its implementation produces reductio as absurdum: when it grossly offends most 
persons common moral sense of what is right.” 135  In the framework of the 
International Criminal Court, it can be argued that the fairness of a prosecutorial 
decision, does not solely affect the due process rights of the accused. A second 
dimension of fairness is reflected in the broader implications of the prosecutorial 
exercise. Since the Prosecutor is empowered by this kind of discretion, it would be 
truly tragic if she overlooked and/or misused this power.  
Conclusion 
 
The current paper purports to highlight the importance and complexity of the 
concept of legitimacy within the context of the ICC under the particular angle of 
prosecutorial discretion. The demand for further independence and transparency, 
advocated by a series of scholars and activists reveal, the perplexed function of legal, 
moral and sociological legitimacy, based on the importance of procedural fairness for 
the foundation of the belief that a decision is legitimate. 
This is an open ended dialectic process that requires a more nuanced and 
flexible attitude towards the  multilayered concept of legitimacy. Pure legalistic-
process oriented approaches can provide only a limited insight, missing the actual 
impact of the Court. On the other hand sociological perceptions have to be assessed 
via the eyes and expectations of the various audiences. However all this theoretical 
framework pressuposes an understanding and realisation of the goals of the 
International Criminal Court.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 I am indebted to Prof. Klabbers for pointing towards this direction. See the very enlighten work of 
Outi Korhonen, New International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance?, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1996) and Jamie Gaskarth, The Virtues of International Society, 18 Eur. J. Int’l R. (2012). 
134 See Jan Klabbers, Towards a Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the Virtues, 27 
TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. (2013), claiming that the “culture formalism” and “constitutional mindset” 
of Koskenniemi’s scholarship, reflect a virtue ethics approach. 
135 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 178 (2002). 
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Decades ago Hannah Arendt wrote for the Eichmann Trial among other things 
the following: “[I] held and hold the opinion that this trial had to take place in the 
interests of justice and nothing else.”136 Under the Rome Statute the interests of 
justice usage is unique, allowing the Prosecutor to forego the investigation of core 
crimes and the prosecution of the ‘worst’ criminals even when all the jurisdiction and 
admissibility parameters have been fulfilled.  
Despite its extraordinary function, this reference serves as a safety net for the 
Prosecutor and the Court, because it simply recognizes the limits of international 
criminal justice.  In that regard, the Prosecutor should explore its potentials in a way 
that would liberate her from accusations of being either utopian or apologetic, too 
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